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FEDERALIST SOCIETY FOR LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY:
2013 NATIONAL LAWYERS CONVENTION
CRIMINAL LAW: CRIMINAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT V. THE FREE PRESS
Panelists: Eugene Volokh, Adam Liptak, Michael Mukasey, Eric M.
Freedman
Moderator: Hon. A. Raymond Randolph1

12:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m.
Friday, November 15, 2013
Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C.
JOHN G. MALCOLM: I am John Malcolm. I am the Chairman of the
Criminal Law Practice Group, so I welcome you all here today for what
should be a really interesting and provocative program.
I really just wanted to take a moment to put in a plug for our practice
group. Those of you who are here, who would like to find out more about our
activities, who would like to be engaged, I would encourage you to reach out to
Dean Reuter. You can contact me, again, John Malcolm at the Heritage
Foundation. We would love to get you involved in our activities.
Now, without further ado, let me turn it over to our moderator,
Judge Ray Randolph of the D.C. Circuit.
[Applause.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Thank you. I wonder if I should
be called a “navigator.”
[Laughter.]
1
Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles
School of Law; Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Correspondent, New York Times; Michael Mukasey,
Partner, Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, and former United States Attorney General; Eric M. Freedman,
Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Hofstra University School of Law;
Moderator: Hon. A. Raymond Randolph, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
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JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: I kind of like that better than
“moderator.” It has visions of Magellan and Christopher Columbus, and all
the rest of it.
But anyway, the subject of our discussion today is an old one, but
it’s a recurring one. There are interests of the press in gathering information
and reporting on the operations of the government, and there are the
interests of the government in preserving national security and enforcing the
criminal law. I think all of you have access to the topic itself, as described,
and I am not going to go any further.
I said it’s an old problem, and I just want to share with you one
thing. That in 1971, I was in the Solicitor General’s office when an
important case arrived. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a Friday
morning in late June and ordered the briefs to be filed by nine o’clock
Saturday morning, and then held the argument at eleven o’clock on Saturday
in an extraordinary session. The case was the Pentagon Papers case, and I
wrote part of the brief without having seen the forty-seven volumes.2 But the
issue, one of the issues that our panelists will be discussing, is an issue that
was left open in Pentagon Papers, and that is, even though you can’t get an
injunction because of the prior restraint doctrine to prevent the newspapers,
in that case, the New York Times and the Washington Post from publishing,
that didn’t necessarily mean that the publishers could not be prosecuted
under—at that time, it was the Espionage Act—for revealing classified
information.3 And that question has recurred again and again and again,
sometimes in cases in our court and certainly in the headlines with people
like Mr. Snowden and Private Manning, most recently.4
Anyway, our first speaker is probably familiar to all of you. Eugene
Volokh is a frequent participator in the Federalist Society programs, and
among other subjects, he teaches free speech at UCLA Law School. He is
the author of numerous articles and a First Amendment casebook and also
the most extraordinary teacher’s manual I have ever seen.5 It accompanies
his casebook. I think it’s twice as long as the casebook, isn’t it?
[Laughter.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Anyway, Professor Volokh
clerked for Judge Alex Kozinski and then for Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
and he’s probably more well known as the founder of The Volokh
2

See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 759 (1971) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
18 U.S.C. § 793 (2006).
See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security
Disclosures, 121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1479-81 (2012).
5
See generally EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES: PROBLEMS,
CASES, AND POLICY ARGUMENTS (4th ed. 2011); Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments,
109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 97 (2009); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace
Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992).
3
4
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Conspiracy, a Web blog that attracts some 20,000 visitors every single
working day.6
Professor Volokh.
EUGENE VOLOKH: Thank you. I should have some PowerPoints, and
there they are.
So I was told that there are two things going on here, and I’ll talk
about them both. Legally speaking, they’re very separate. Practically, they
come up often in very, very similar contexts.
The first thing is the news gatherer’s privilege question. Now, the
leading case on this at the Supreme Court level is Branzburg v. Hayes,
although it turns out the law of the news gatherer’s privilege ends up being
quite a bit different than you would expect from reading just the case.7 The
question in Branzburg v. Hayes was whether journalists should have a
privilege to refuse to reveal their confidential sources; the journalists said,
“Look, we need to have this privilege, because otherwise it would burden
our communication of the news to the public, because people would be
much more reluctant to talk to us.”8 And the court said, “No.”9 The
majority—five out of nine, but five is all it takes—said, “No.” You have the
same duties as any citizen does to testify about possibly relevant
information, especially in the context of a grand jury subpoena, which was
the issue there. You have no privilege not to testify.10
Now, the dissent said there should be a privilege.11 Actually, the
one justice dissenting, Douglas, called for pretty much an absolute privilege,
and three other justices, Stewart, Marshall, and Brennan, called for a
privilege that basically sounds in strict scrutiny.12 Disclosure is required
only if there is a compelling interest, and there is no less restrictive means of
getting the information needed to serve that interest.13
You’d think that would be it, but there was this concurrence, not a
concurrence in the judgment, just a concurrence of somebody who joined
the majority fully, Justice Powell. Justice Powell essentially said, “Well, I
just want to repeat what the majority is saying” (and it did say something
like this towards the end of its opinion, although Powell elaborated on it)

6

See Volokh, UCLA SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www2.law.ucla.edu/volokh/ (last visited Aug. 13,
2014) (noting the number of daily visitors to The Volokh Conspiracy). See generally Eugene Volokh, The
Volokh Conspiracy, THE WASHINGTON POST, http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/.
7
See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
8
Id. at 682.
9
Id. at 685–86.
10
Id. at 682.
11
Id. at 737–47 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12
Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
13
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 678.
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“that there are protections for newsmen.”14 There is to be “no harassment of
newsmen,” which sounded in the context of the opinion like no going after
newsmen just in order to, for example, identify a source who might be a
government employee whom you want to fire or somebody else who might
want to retaliate against––or for that matter, harassing a newsman because
you don’t like what he is saying about you, so you called him in front of the
grand jury as a kind of punishment to take up his time, to ruin his relations
with the sources, and the like.15
Investigation must be in good faith and with legitimate need.16 The
connection to the investigation must be more than remote and tenuous.17
Note that these are the kinds of things that in principle you can get without
First Amendment scrutiny under just normal standards related to subpoenas;
you could quash such subpoenas based on these kinds of factors.
And, finally––this is where the concurring opinion got even more
potentially confusing–– Justice Powell said that the proper balance between
freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant
testimony with respect to criminal conduct must be struck on a case-by-case
basis.18
So you might say “Well, that’s still somebody who joined the
majority opinion, so there is no privilege,” or you might say, “Well, because
he was a necessary vote for the majority opinion, there is some kind of
modest privilege sounding like a slightly more aggressive enforcement of
subpoena standards.” Yet several circuit courts basically said that Powell’s
opinion calls for something like strict scrutiny, which is funny because
that’s what the dissent called for, and the one thing we know about Powell’s
opinion is that he dissented from the dissent.19
Justice Powell could have given the dissenting justices the necessary
fifth vote to basically make it a majority, subject to Douglas’ more
aggressive view, but he didn’t. He had more in common with the majority
than the dissent. Yet for quite a while, the dominant view among circuit
courts was, “Yes, there is a privilege, notwithstanding that.” Surprising, and
in some measure there has been a retreat from that: Some recent opinions
have cut more in favor of taking the view that in fact there is no news

14

Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 710.
17
Id.
18
Id. (“The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a proper
balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with
respect to criminal conduct.”).
19
Id. at 709–10; see, e.g., LaRouche v. Nat’l Broadcasting Co., Inc., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir.
1986).
15
16
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gatherer’s privilege.20 So that’s the issue at the First Amendment level.
Note, incidentally, that even under a strict scrutiny approach, the
news gatherer’s privilege might be actually quite modest in scope in those
cases we have been hearing most about where the person is being—the
journalist is being asked to testify about a source of a leak, of an allegedly
illegal leak.
You can think of there being two general classes of cases involving
news gatherer’s privilege. The first class is when somebody calls a reporter
and says, “Look, I’m not involved in a crime, but I know something about it.
I’m a government employee. I’ve seen evidence of fraud. I’m going to pass
this along to you, but you’ve got to keep my name out of it, because
otherwise I’ll lose my job, otherwise I might be harassed in various ways. I
am not going to be prosecuted, because I am not involved in the crime. I’m
just a witness, but I don’t want to get involved any more than I need to.”
That’s one class of cases, and in those cases, maybe strict scrutiny would
provide quite substantial protection for the reporter and for the source.
But the second class of cases is when somebody is leaking
something to the reporter, so the reporter is really the only percipient
witness, assuming the leak is criminal or even tortious, to the underlying bad
act. So there, under strict scrutiny applied, at least in a nonfatal-in-fact way,
you might say there is a compelling interest in enforcing the law banning the
leaks. And while in principle you might be able to find other evidence about
the leak, very little evidence is going to be as persuasive to the jury as the
other side of the leak coming forward and saying, “Yep. He called me. He
told me. That’s what happened.” So in principle, for the second set of
cases, this qualified privilege––even if you read Powell’s concurrences as
endorsing it or even if you adopt the view of the principal dissent––wouldn’t
actually amount to much.
So that’s the First Amendment picture. Some circuits accept a
qualified privilege, although again not clear how much weight it would
carry in the leak persecution cases.21 Other courts, I think with a more
correct reading of Branzburg, reject it.22
But if you step back from this and look at it as a matter of broader
First Amendment law, this question of when the government is entitled to
every person’s evidence is actually pretty complicated.
20
See In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Miller) 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2005); McKevitt v. Pallasch,
339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
21
See, e.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d
963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1993); In re Shain, 978 F.2d
850, 852 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (1st Cir. 1988);
von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487,
1504 (11th Cir. 1986).
22
See supra note 20; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584–86 (6th Cir. 1987).
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So for example—and this is what the dissent in Branzburg
stressed—there is a long line of cases involving expressive association,
membership and association, which said that actually, yes, strict scrutiny is
what’s required in order to get information about your First Amendment
activity in the form of joining the NAACP or joining any other association.23
Likewise, as to expenditures in support of political groups, the Court has
routinely said that the strict scrutiny is required for such disclosures,
although this strict scrutiny has often been satisfied, sometimes over Justice
Thomas’s dissent.24
When it comes to reading material, there are only a couple of lower
court cases involving subpoenas of books people have read; both courts
have actually also applied strict scrutiny.25
Now, when it comes to other situations, though, it’s quite different.
When it comes to identifying anonymous commenters, lower courts have
generally applied some kind of heightened scrutiny, but when it comes to
other things, for example, tenure review letters, EEOC v. University of
Pennsylvania rejected any heightened scrutiny in that kind of situation. And
that is so even though there, too, the concern was that revealing the identity
of confidential speakers and the content of their speech is going to interfere
with speech and deter speech, just as was the case in NAACP cases.26
Likewise, in the newspaper editorial board discussion case, Herbert
v. Lando, the court rejected a privilege, even though the concern likewise
was that if you can’t communicate confidentially, people will communicate
less candidly or perhaps not at all.27
Likewise, say somebody wants to subpoena your communications
with your friends. For example, say you’re being prosecuted for some crime
and the government wants to show motive, so they call your friend to the
stand to testify about what you told him about it. And he says, “Well, I
don’t want to testify. That would chill speech between me and my friends.”
Sure, it would chill speech between him and his friends. But he has to
testify, in any case. So that’s what makes it actually a little complicated to
figure out where to fit the newsgatherer-source communication case.
Branzburg, I think has resolved that question, but I can see why it was a 5to-4 case.
There remains the question about whether there should be a
common-law privilege (not a First Amendment-mandated privilege) for
23

See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); id. at 980 (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
25
See Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d 1044 (Colo. 2002); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena to Kramerbooks & Afterwords Inc., 26 Med. L. Rptr. 1599 (D.D.C.1998).
26
Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201 (1990).
27
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979).
24
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communications between journalists and confidential sources.28 Remember
in federal court, privileges—by federal rules of evidence adopted by act of
Congress—are a matter for continuing development of the common law:
Congress has specifically required courts to develop (and perhaps even
create) privileges through the common law method.29
In Branzburg, the court rejected this argument, and some recent
courts have said, “well, Branzburg disposed of it,” and I think that’s a
reasonable point. But there is still the question of whether that should be
revisited, common law being something that can change over time.
Today, statutes in thirty-three states provide for such a privilege.30
And even in the remaining states, at least some courts have recognized such
a privilege as a matter either of state constitutional or common law.31
Of course, the privileges are quite different. Some are absolute.
Some are qualified. Some are for all speakers. Some are limited to
professional journalists, however one defines that.
Moreover, there are some possible analogies justifying a journalistsource privilege: the attorney-client privilege, psychotherapist-patient
privilege, clergy-penitent, and spouse-spouse privileges. Of course, how far
those analogies go, it’s hard to tell. These are only analogies. They are not
identities. We are not talking about attorneys. We are not talking about
psychotherapists. At the same time, you can make plausible arguments that
there are similar societal interests in fostering candid communication that
yield a justification for a privilege in the journalist source context as in the
others.
Note, though, that most of those other privileges are not absolute.
For example, there is a crime fraud exception from many such privileges.
And it seems to me that if you are trying to leak documents in violation of
the criminal law and you are calling up a journalist to help you commit that
crime, that would fit very neatly into a crime-fraud exception if there is to be
such an exception to any common law journalist privilege.
Likewise, more broadly, the journalist is the only percipient witness
in many of those cases of the leak cases, and that, it seems to me, cuts in
favor as a common law matter of carving out an exception in those
situations.
Now let me turn to the second category of questions, which often
28

See, e.g., In re Williams, 766 F. Supp. 358, 367–68 (W.D. Pa. 1991) (discussing the common law
privilege at length).
29
FED. R. EVID. 501.
30
Henry Cohen, Journalists’ Privilege to Withhold Information in Judicial and Other Proceedings:
State Shield Statutes (Cong. Research Serv. 2007).
31
Id.
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arise in the same situation. Let’s say that something has been leaked to the
journalist. One question is, “Can the journalist keep the source out of jail, in
a sense, by not revealing his identity?” The second question is, “Can the
journalist keep himself out of jail?”
This often comes up when there are leaked government secrets,
perhaps related to national security or perhaps to other matters. But it could
also arise for corporate secrets, violation of a duty of confidentiality, or duty
of loyalty. It could arise for trade secrets. Trade secret law, at least in
principle, if you look at black letter summaries, penalizes downstream
distributors and not just those who violate their own duty of
confidentiality.32
Breach of a professional confidence is what happens if a journalist
publishes something that was wrongly leaked to him by a lawyer or by a
psychotherapist.
The publication of illegally recorded cell phone
conversations is not exactly the same issue, but closely analogous. This, of
course, arose in the Bartnicki v. Vopper case, in which the Court held that
downstream distributors who weren’t involved in the original illegal
recording (a tape just showed up in their mailbox)33 are immune, at least
when the matter is of public concern (or maybe of exceptionally great public
concern, if you listen to the concurrence).34
You could imagine a similar issue arising with regard to publication
of unconstitutionally gathered evidence––where the underlying violation is
not of criminal law or civil law, but of the Constitution. What if there’s
something that’s gathered in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and a
newspaper learns about that and publishes that? Could that lead to a
criminal prosecution or a civil claim?
Now so far I’ve spoken of situation in which the reporter gets
documents out of the blue. That’s what seems to have happened to
Bartnicki v. Vopper.35 Even then, there might in principle be liability,
especially if it’s an original document and not just a copy––that could be
literally receipt of stolen property. But there could also be liability even
when there is no tangible stolen property; in Bartnicki v. Vopper, the
publication of illegally intercepted material was civilly actionable, and
sometimes criminally actionable (though the Court held that the First
Amendment trumps that cause of action).36
But, at the other extreme, imagine a reporter solicits documents
from a source––calls up the source and says, “Hey, you know, I hear you
32
33
34
35
36

See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.2 (Deering 2014).
Id. at 517, 519.
Id. at 535–56 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
Id. at 531.
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know something about this; tell me”––and it’s perfectly clear that reporter
knows the revelation would be illegal, either criminal or tortious.
Such a request could constitute soliciting crime. It could be
conspiracy to create a crime. It could be aiding and abetting crime. It could
be intentional inducement of breach of contract or civil conspiracy. There
could be pretty serious risk of liability there.
And of course there are lots of scenarios in between. You get a
document. You call the person to confirm. Then you have a conversation.
In the conversation, other things come out. How much of that is induced or
solicited misconduct?
So these are the issues that can come up. And a lot of them are the
bread and butter of everyday news gathering, and the question is what
should be done about it.
[Applause.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Thank you. You know, one time
I was moderating a panel. A noted Harvard law professor was speaking, and
I kept handing him notes, and unlike Gene, he didn’t sit down. And he
finally turned to me and said, “The judge is getting nervous. He is looking
for a gavel,” and I said, “Actually, I was looking for a U.S. Marshal.”
[Laughter.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Our next speaker is Adam Liptak.
He’s been the New York Times Supreme Court reporter since 2008. He’s a
graduate of the Yale College and Yale Law School. He’s practiced law.
He’s taught media law at UCLA Law School, at the Yale Law School, and
the Columbia School of Journalism. In addition to covering the Supreme
Court, he’s written many articles in law reviews and publications such as
Businessweek, Vanity Fair, The New Yorker, and other national publications,
and we’re very happy to have Mr. Liptak with us.37
[Applause.]
ADAM LIPTAK: Thank you, Judge.
So I did. It was a while ago, but I used to practice in this area, and I
remember once being on a panel back at the New York City Bar probably in
the ‘90s. Judge Mukasey was still on the bench, and I had looked up, did a
little research, and I saw that Judge Mukasey had been a press lawyer back
in the day. Patterson Belknap, am I right about that, representing the Daily
37
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, The Hidden Federal Shield Law: On The Justice Department’s
Regulations Governing Subpoenas to the Press, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 227 (1999); Adam Liptak,
Deciding if Inmates Get to Know How They’ll be Executed, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2014, at A10; Adam
Liptak, Justices May Limit Securities Fraud Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2014, at B1.
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News? And I said to him at the little dinner beforehand, “God, it must be so
good for us in the press to appear before a wise judge like you who really
understands our arguments.” He said, “Wrong. Wrong question. The
question is, “How much does it hurt you?”
[Laughter.]
ADAM LIPTAK: And I fear I have a little bit of the same thing, because if
you really know your arguments, you know the weak spots in your
arguments, and I think I will start with Eugene’s topics in reverse order, and
on some of them, I will say just what you’ll expect me to say, and on some
of them, I might make some admissions against interest.
So, I think there are three basic propositions here. In the great press
cases of the ‘60s and ‘70s, at a time when the press really had a lot of power,
prestige, authority, and was thought to be responsible, mature, someone you
could deal with—you may not like what the editors did on every occasion,
but you could talk to the New York Times Washington Bureau chief. We
weren’t living in a WikiLeaks era but in an era where there was somebody
on the other side of the discussion who was part of your milieu, and in those
cases, we almost ran the table on everything we cared about.
In Pentagon Papers, we, more or less, established the proposition
that you cannot stop the publication of truthful, newsworthy information that
citizens might like to hear about in order to govern themselves in a
democracy. So no prior restraints, and I understand there’s always a little
bit of give and always a little balancing, but that’s certainly the message we
took away from Pentagon Papers, no prior restraint.38
Other cases leading up to Bartnicki seem to say, more or less, that
there could also be no subsequent punishment of press publication of
truthful and newsworthy information, even if somebody violated the law
somewhere, so long as you were something like the passive recipient of the
information. So no prior restraint, no subsequent punishment so long as you
were—Eugene used the word “innocent”—passive. You didn’t go and
break into somebody’s office and steal the stuff. You didn’t hack
somebody’s phone. Somebody violated some obligation of that other
person, gave it to you.
Then in Branzburg, amazingly, we got within one vote of running
the table of establishing what the First Amendment doesn’t seem to me to
say, that we have a special privilege against subpoenas not available to
others.39 So I think the First Amendment does say this: it says no
government censorship of at least speech about politics that’s truthful and
useful in self-governance. But to go further than that and say that the First
38
39

New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 725–26 (1971).
See generally Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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Amendment has in it a privilege that we don’t have to obey subpoenas when
we are sometimes the sole eyewitness to a crime, that’s a bold proposition.
You can really congratulate the press lawyers, myself included, for baffling
the courts with this proposition for decades, for really, essentially, turning
the dissent.
Plus, everyone talks about the Powell concurrence, and it is a little
confusing, but it’s very, very brief.40 It’s two or three paragraphs, and to
build on that foundation, the idea that there’s constitutional protection, it
was quite an achievement, and sooner or later we were going to be called on
it, and it was partly a function of the decline of our power and prestige that
we were called on it, but I don’t think that it was wrong.
I do think that as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, as in the
Justice Department guidelines, the statutes that Eugene described, federal
common law as Judge Tatel sketched out in the Judy Miller case, where at
least you get some balancing, and where what you really want in these cases
is to get before a judge and make your case.41 This was a really important
publication, and as Tatel put it, you balance how much harm the leak caused
versus how much good the publication did. And in some cases, the good
will outweigh the harm. So anyway, I think it would be wise to allow a
sensible balancing and to avoid needless confrontations between the press
and the government.
And I think the place to look for how this works and how messy and
unruly it is, but how this really ought to work is in Alexander Bickel’s great
book The Morality of Consent where he welcomed what he called the
“contest between press and government.”42 The basic idea is it’s the
government’s job to keep the government’s secret, and if somebody violates
an oath to keep a secret, by all means punish that person; but the press, if it
finds out what it can, without itself committing a criminal violation, and
publishes what it believes will aid citizens in a democracy to govern
themselves should be left alone.43 And here’s what Bickel says: “This is not
an arrangement whose justification is efficiency, logic, or clarity. Its
justification is that it accommodates power to freedom and vice versa. It
reconciles the irreconcilable.”44 He acknowledges that this is, “an untidy
accommodation.”45 But he goes on to say the accommodation works, but it
“works well only when there is forbearance and continence on both sides. It
threatens to break down when the adversaries turn into enemies, when they
40

Id. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
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break diplomatic relations with each other, gird for and wage war.”46
Thanks.
[Applause.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Adam mentioned Alexander
Bickel who was truly a great constitutional law professor. As an historical
aside, he argued for the New York Times in the Pentagon Papers case. I was
there, and I remember one exchange where he was pressed again and again
and again with a hypothetical, and the hypothetical was: let’s suppose that
what the New York Times is printing would result in the deaths of many
servicemen. Do you still say that the courts can’t enjoin the New York
Times from printing it? He finally was backed to the wall, and his reply was
something to the effect—he said, “I have to admit that my humanitarian
instincts in that type of a situation overcome my devotion to freedom of
speech,” which I thought was a great answer.47
EUGENE VOLOKH: And so offensive to some. The ACLU filed an
after-argument brief objecting to that answer.48
[Laughter.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Our next speaker is well known to
all of you, I’m sure. Michael Mukasey is now a partner at the Debevoise
firm in New York City. He served as a distinguished Attorney General of
the United States from 2007 to January 2009. Before that for 18 years, he
was a District Judge in the Southern District of New York, becoming Chief
Judge in 2000. During his tenure on the court, he presided over many
notable trials, including the terrorism trial of the blind sheik, Omar Abdel
Rahman. Among his many awards, he has received the Federal Bar
Council’s Learned Hand Medal for Excellence in Federal Jurisprudence.
General Mukasey.
MICHAEL MUKASEY: Thanks.
[Applause.]
MICHAEL MUKASEY: Before I get into where all of this has wound up
today, I think maybe it is useful to go back a little bit and figure out what the
Founders who wrote the document on which folks base all these arguments
for openness were really all about. You may recall that the Constitution
itself was drafted during the span of a baseball season in Philadelphia with
the doors closed. Not only did they close the doors against outside inquiry,
46
47
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but they barred any report of what was going on inside, and they well
understood the need for secrecy. Even in the document itself when it came
to drafting a section relating to the obligation of both houses of Congress to
publish their reports, they carved out an exception for those matters that it
was necessary to hold confidential.49
Even Patrick Henry, who was an anti-federalist and felt that not
enough—the new government was not characterized by enough openness,
even with the Bill of Rights in place, wrote, “I am not an advocate for
divulging indiscriminately all the operations of government.
Such
transactions as relate to military operations or affairs of great importance,
the immediate publication of which might defeat the interest of the
community, I would not want to be published, till the end which required
their secrecy should have been effected.”50 That sounds almost quaint
today, but in point of fact, there have been virtually no prosecutions. There
have been actually no prosecutions for publication of leaks certainly in
recent memory and I don’t believe ever.
Not that there haven’t been leaks that threaten national security.
During World War II, one of our newspapers leaked the fact that there were
plans by the Roosevelt administration to come in on the side of the allies,
and Germany acted on those plans by declaring war on the United States
shortly after Pearl Harbor and saved us the trouble of waiting for a German
attack.51 You might say that was actually a salutary leak.
A potentially non-salutary leak involved a leak that we had read the
Japanese code. A grand jury was actually convened to investigate that leak
and never returned an indictment because the Japanese apparently either
didn’t subscribe to the Chicago Tribune or else, and more likely, were so
hubristic about the validity of their code that they couldn’t believe that we
could have solved it, and so the government declined to prosecute.52
We’ve come a long way since then, and I’m not sure we’ve come in
a useful direction. Professor Bickel talked about what happens when the
two sides become, among other things, incontinent, and that, I think aptly
describes the nature of what goes on today.53 If you look at the Snowden
leaks, that is a working definition of incontinence, and yet there is in the
atmosphere kind of an unwillingness to go ahead and prosecute people who
do that, I think in large measure because the people who would be doing the
prosecuting—and who, by the way, are prosecuting at a rate that is more
49
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy . . . “).
50
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substantial than any in any administration before, I think they’ve got, what,
six or seven leak cases pending now, which is six or seven more than we
had. And I frankly envy them. I would have liked to have had that record.
The trouble is that all of this is being done by an administration that,
for example, at the time of the bin Laden killing went out and boasted about
the trove of information that had been discovered in bin Laden’s hideout and
of course warned anybody who had been in touch with him that they would
have to alter their method of operation, identified SEAL Team Six as those
who would carry out the operation and thereby put a target on SEAL Team
Six and may very well have been responsible for the fact that several
members of that team were killed in a subsequent terrorist operation—
disclosed that there had been a Pakistani physician who had participated in
an attempt to gather intelligence about bin Laden’s residence, with the result
that that doctor is now doing life in jail.54
Fast forward to the Stuxnet virus where we got leaks of information
about conversations in the Situation Room in the White House disclosing
that the United States was involved in putting the Stuxnet virus into the
Iranian centrifuges, a piece of timing that was really unfortunate because it
came only a few days after a U.S. military officer said that a cyber-attack on
the United States would warrant a kinetic response when you put those two
things together.55 What he was saying essentially was that the United States
had committed an act of war against Iran.
The operation that resulted in this more recently in the seizure of
Abu Anas al Libi was leaked to a fare-thee-well to the point where people
were getting calls the night before it went down asking whether something
was up in Libya. Under those circumstances, I think there is what we
lawyers call a “standing problem” for an administration to press leak
prosecutions. It’s not a legal defense by any manner or means, but it makes
the atmospherics a good deal more difficult.
That said, I don’t think that we have any need for any of the shield
statutes that have been proposed.56 I notice that Adam stayed away from
that. Thank you. Because what they ultimately come down to is a set of
determinations by a judge as to a balance between the harm that could be
caused by the leak as compared to the good that could be done by it, which
is a balance that involves comparing complete imponderables, and the
comparison is being done by somebody who’s got absolutely no training, no
background in it, and in the end, of course, under all of these statutes, the
54
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reporter gets to do exactly what the reporter gets to do now, which is to
refuse to disclose the information if he decides that the judge has struck the
balance the wrong way. There is no requirement that the information be
disclosed to the court before the litigation proceeds. So I think we don’t
need those statutes.
So far as prosecutions, there is in force an espionage statute that I
think fills the bill nicely.57 It says that whoever with intangible reason to
believe that it is to be used to the injury of the United States or the
advantage of a foreign nation—and that would include an entity that is not a
nation—discloses information relating to the national defense shall be
punished by death or by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.58
And, in an appropriate situation, there is absolutely no reason why that can’t
be used. I don’t think we need more statutes. I don’t think we need a shield
section. I think what we need is some common sense and some discretion
on both sides.
At the Justice Department, I will tell you that there is a whole set of
procedures, including a requirement that the Attorney General approve any
subpoena for a reporter before it’s served.59 So in essence, the position of
the dissent in Branzburg has been carried through administratively by actual
practice within the Justice Department. I think what we don’t need is more
statutes, more procedures. I think what we need is common sense and
restraint on both sides.
Thanks very much.
[Applause.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Thank you, General.
Our next speaker is Eric Freedman. He is the Maurice A. Deane
Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law at the Hofstra Law School in
New York. He is a graduate of Yale College and Yale Law School. He
clerked for Judge Irving R. Kaufman of the Second Circuit and practiced
law in Washington and New York. He is the author of numerous scholarly
articles, mainly dealing with the writ of habeas corpus, and I have read
several of them, and they are outstanding.60 He is currently Director and Of
Counsel to the National Coalition Against Censorship and is former
Chairman of the Communications Media Committee of the ACLU.
Professor Freedman.
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[Applause.]
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: Now, with that introduction, it’s particularly
interesting that I find myself in the position of the rabbi who had a couple
come to see him, and the wife said, “You know, my husband is absolutely
terrible,” blah, blah, blah, and the rabbi said, “You’re right.” The husband
said, “My wife, she’s absolutely terrible,” and the rabbi said, “You’re right.”
Then the wife came back and said, “Now, hang on a second. We can’t both
be right,” and the rabbi said, “You’re right.”
[Laughter.]
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: I find myself here – and it’s one of the great
pleasures of the Federalist Society why you get so many unusual suspects
enjoying coming to these programs – in a somewhat mushy middle,
agreeing with some parts of what’s been said and disagreeing with others.
I start by saying that I absolutely agree with Judge Mukasey.
Balancing tests, whether they come from judicial doctrine or are
incorporated into statutes, are completely useless in doing what we’re trying
to do.61 Now, I reach a different conclusion about the consequences of that,
but he is completely right. The judges not only don’t have any particular
training or expertise, but in particular have an institutionally flawed
perspective because of course the judge always wants more information
relevant to this case and this matter, and that’s perfectly understandable. No
one who is presiding over a real case is likely to take the perspective of the
longer term interests which are being served, namely half a loaf is better
than none; we want the information at least to be out, even if we don’t know
the name of the source, because the next time you’re going to get neither the
information nor the source. It’s exactly like you’re trying hard to control
your weight, and the waiter brings some very tempting dessert, and you’re
supposed to say, “Well, I understand that the long-term consequences are
very bad, and so I am sending the dessert back.” And at least in that case,
you would be feeling the long-term consequences; whereas, here, we’re
talking that the long term is that in some other future case information is not
going to come out. And therefore, as far as I’m concerned, the solution is
that any statutory privilege that’s created must be absolute in the area that it
covers, and balancing tests go away. And absolute to me means absolute,
just like any of the privileges that Professor Volokh mentioned. In attorneyclient for instance, what absolute means is the government does not get it,
much as they would like it, much as it’s very relevant and so on, unless the
attorney is a participant in the crime, meaning shares the criminal intent of
the client, which is rarely the case, of course, for ordinary journalists but, as
has been suggested, is a major problem in leak investigations, because
61
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giving the material to the reporter is itself the crime. And so you have the
government always being able to say, “Well, the reporter is a participant, if
not at least a witness.”
You wouldn’t say that if the facts were that the lawyer’s client led
him to where the victim’s body was buried. In fact, there’s a pretty famous
case in which the lawyers got ethics awards for keeping precisely that
information confidential.62 So I would certainly say that the privilege has to
be absolute in situations where the only crime is the revelation of the
information itself by the source, and I’m not sure law enforcement would
lose much by that, because the truth of the matter is that technology at the
moment is making much of this part of the discussion irrelevant. It used to
be the U.S. Government was very big. It was very hard to know where the
leak came from. Nowadays, NSA knows everything about everything. It’s
not very difficult to find out the information flow, at least not nearly as
difficult as it used to be.
Journalist’s privilege is analogous to attorney-client privilege
because it’s the system that’s being protected. We talk sort of vaguely about
the public interest in the information. Let’s be a little more concrete. If
there were no leaks, Congress would be out of business in terms of
executive branch oversight, or at least 100 percent vulnerable to whatever
the people briefing them choose to tell them or not tell them. In fact, John
Kennedy, subsequent to the Bay of Pigs, said he wished the administration
had not put pressure on the New York Times to keep the planned invasion
out of the paper, because, “Maybe if you had printed more about the
operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake.”63 Much of
what the President learns, he reads in the newspapers. Again, John Kennedy
used to say that, “I hear more from the New York Times than I learn from
my CIA briefing.”64 I know some of you people believe in a unitary
executive. Ask any President of the United States whether there is a unitary
executive. There are thousands and thousands and thousands of people
pursuing their own agendas, much of which the President finds out by
reading the newspapers.
Now, regarding Judge Mukasey’s remarks to the effect that it’s
terrible how the Obama administration has leaked all its successes.
Assuming that to be true, it’s not something that was invented by the Obama
administration. In fact, one influential document in the Pentagon Papers
case was the very long affidavit of Max Frankel describing at length the
62
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practice of government leaks for the purpose of advancing the agenda of the
incumbent administration.65 Again, more information on public affairs is
better than less.
And that’s not just true about public affairs. The President of
General Motors is better off knowing that there is a problem than not
knowing it. If there is an environmental violation or if there is harassment
or if there is some other problem in that empire half loaf is better than none.
It’s too bad you don’t know the source. You want the information. And so
I think because judges balancing in all those situations is likely to put the
balance the wrong way, absolute privilege is the way to go.
And there is a second reason, which Judge Mukasey also
mentioned. I know we’re lawyers, and we think that legal formulations
matter, but we delude ourselves. At the end of the day, the source is either
going to trust the reporter or not, and this is not going to depend on whether
there is a three-part test or three-and-a-half-part test that has one prong and
two forks. Without an absolute privilege, the only real protection is that the
source believes that the reporter will go to jail for the cause and stay there.
Well, going to jail for the cause, as with Martin Luther King, has
power if there is sympathy on the part of the public for the underlying
principle and the underlying cause. In that respect, a public climate of
unhappiness with government spying, government secrecy and so on is good
because it’s not the lawbreakers who are supposed to be the heroes of the
story. It’s the number of public spirited and innocent people, as Professor
Volokh suggested, whose desire for anonymity is perfectly legitimate, as the
Supreme Court has recognized in protecting the anonymous pamphleteer
against a proposed regulation that the source of the speech has to be
disclosed. And the reason Supreme Court recognized that protection is
because truth will come from many voices.66
Journalists’ choices about what parts of the Pentagon Papers to
publish may be controversial and may even be wrong in some objective
sense, but the aggregate social costs of moving the decision-making power
from the individual to the government are too high in totality, regardless of
what you might think about any particular decision. And to that statement, I
hear the answer coming, “Hang on a second, weren’t the government
officials elected?” Well, fortunately, I’ve got a Founder on my side by the
name of James Madison who said a faction is a group, whether amounting to
a minority or majority of the whole, whose decisions are contrary to the
long-term aggregate interest of the community.67 That is to say, we’ve got
65
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to protect the minority voices because the underlying policy, though
approved by the majority, may just happen to be wrong. And very often
that’s precisely the conclusion that comes from leaks.
So what’s the path forward here? As everyone agrees, the current
Supreme Court is completely unsympathetic to the concept of a First
Amendment privilege, and so will all future courts. They’re judges. The
common law privilege has power because there’s a lot of state and lower
federal court law supporting the privilege, but it’s the wrong kind of
privilege. That’s balancing test all over again, and so even if the common
law argument had not been wrongly dismissed with the back of the hand in
the recent James Risen case, I don’t think it’s got a long-term future.68 And
that does leave a statute, which makes sense, because often the reason you
have a statute is to do something that you can’t get under the Constitution or
the common law, but it’s got to be the right kind of a statute. It shouldn’t be
going for breadth. It should be going for strength. Whatever it covers, it’s
absolute. Otherwise, as with the various bills in Congress now, you have
just made a bad situation worse, because Congress will announce that it
solved the problem and go off to do other things, while the judges will just
keep doing what they’re doing, exactly as Judge Mukasey said, which at this
moment means acting like government officials and panicking when they
sense that power may be dispersed and information may be getting out of
control.
So that leads me to the final minute-and-a-half, which is on
prosecution of reporters – as Adam put it, not keeping their sources out of
jail, keeping themselves out of jail. And there, I actually have no problem
agreeing with Judge Mukasey. If the government wants to prosecute the
publication and undertake the legal-political-public-opinion-and-jury
problem of proving criminal intent on the part of the publication, it should
go right ahead. And in that respect, there is already a layer of protection, as
was briefly alluded to by Adam. There are a number of cases involving
leaks from confidential judicial disciplinary proceedings, confidential
juvenile proceedings, release of records of a rape case that ought not to have
been released, in all of which you could not hold the reporter liable for what
was an innocent disclosure, innocent in the sense that the reporter may know
perfectly well that the source acted illegally but the reporter was not acting
with any malicious intent.69 And the Espionage Act says with intent to harm
the United States.70 If you want to prosecute the New York Times under the
Espionage Act for leaking the Pentagon Papers with intent to harm the
United States, go right ahead. I have no constitutional law problem with it.
68
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It may seem a little strange to be challenging the government to hit
you with a nuclear weapon, but there’s something to be said for nuclear
weapons—which is neither side uses them. So here the existence of that
nuclear weapon keeps the press on a certain side of the line, and keeps the
government somewhat backed off. I do agree with what everybody has said
that the situation over the last 35 years or so has been a kind of rough
accommodation of work it out and we’ll give a little, you give a little. And
that has frayed so badly in recent years that we may be better off
acknowledging that, in fact, the two sides are at war with each other and at
least get the restraints on use of force in war rather than a set of agreements
which neither side is now keeping.
[Applause.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Before we take questions, would
any of our panelists like to comment? General Mukasey.
MICHAEL MUKASEY: Just two small points with regard to the last
points that were made. The espionage statute says, “With intent or reason to
believe,” so you don’t need specific intent to harm.71 All you need is reason
to believe that harm will result, and I would suggest that there have been a
number of disclosures that were made with a reason to believe that harm
would result.
I also agree that there is no way that a prosecution would be
undertaken in those cases, except in the most extreme situations which we
haven’t faced.
So far as an absolute privilege is concerned, you then get to the
issue of defining what constitutes a journalist, and that in itself is something
I would not want to see either legislators or courts do, in large measure,
because not only would they be overly inclusive and not inclusive enough,
not inclusive enough by not including people who like to publicize things
and devote a great deal of attention and effort to it, although they may not
earn their living doing it, and over-inclusive by including, for example,
correspondence of Fars, the Iranian news agency; Xinhua, the Chinese news
agency; and to date myself, TASS, the old Soviet news agency, who were
intelligence agents. They were regularly credentialed to come to the United
States as journalists, because it was known that they would occupy a
privileged position with respect to information gathering.
And so far as whether the Obama administration leaks, I willingly
acknowledge that they did not, but when it comes to leaking information
that is potentially injurious to national security, I think it has reached an
absolutely unprecedented level, at least in my experience.
71
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EUGENE VOLOKH: I sympathize with a lot of the arguments for
openness, but I sympathize with a lot of the arguments for secrecy, too.
There are a lot of things—
PANELIST: Says a law professor.
[Laughter.]
EUGENE VOLOKH: There are a lot of things that we rightly expect the
government to keep secret. It’s a federal crime to leak tax information; I’m
not saying necessarily this means that a reporter who gets some tax
information and decides to publish it should be liable.72 I’m not sure there is
a federal statute that covers the reporter in that situation. But say a reporter
were to call up an IRS agent saying, “You got anything for me on politician
so-and-so or actor so-and-so or my online critic so-and-so?” “Yeah, sure,
here it is.” Do we think that openness is so valuable that that should be
protected and that the reporter should not have to reveal the name of the
person who leaked that? I am skeptical about that.
Likewise, we are all lawyers, and if somebody were to call, if
somebody were to try to get information from our staff or our paralegals or
our secretaries about some famous client, I think we’d be screaming bloody
murder, and I think we’d be right. And I think we’d be right in trying to go
after this person for trying to get this information, even if he is arguing that
(a) it’s of public interest, and (b) maybe even he thinks—and we disagree—
that this reveals some sort of shenanigans on the part of the trial team that’s
not properly disclosing certain information or what have you in a criminal
case or for that matter a civil case. (There are all sorts of allegations of such
shenanigans levied against law firms, rightly or wrongly, all the time.)
So I would like to think that there would be some continuing
protection against that. We should be able to go after a person who
deliberately solicits the revelation of information that he knows would be
either criminal or tortious. And if we are going after the suspected leaker,
we should be able to get the only other witness to the crime––that is to say,
the reporter––to actually testify about that. Now maybe that’s impossible
without shutting off too much valuable information about all sorts of
important things. I don’t know, but I don’t think we can dismiss the
confidentiality interest that easily.
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: May I? I’m sorry. Adam—
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: I think Adam is next.
ADAM LIPTAK: So I, first of all, want to disassociate myself with Eric’s
suggestion that the Obama administration should please prosecute the New
72
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York Times.
[Laughter.]
ADAM LIPTAK: Don’t bring it on.
I also want to make a pitch for half a loaf. I understand that in the
pure good of theory and absolute privilege, it would be a wonderful thing:
(a) it will never happen, (b) it can’t be absolute because it will at least be
overcome by a Sixth Amendment fair trial right.73 And (c), there’s a lot to
be said for being able to make your pitch not only to a prosecutor as a matter
of prosecutorial discretion but a judge on some balancing basis. And even
the prospect of satellite litigation over this question can be very valuable.
Time is your friend. The underlying case may plead or settle out, and
publicity will be brought to bear, and that can influence conduct. So I think
there’s more than a little to be said for getting something rather than nothing
out of a shield law.
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: On Adam’s point, we’ll have to agree to disagree
as to balancing. On Judge Mukasey’s point about defining “journalist,”
that’s an absolutely serious concern that every statute or proposal has to
face. All I can say is that it has been confronted and dealt with one way or
another in the thirty-five states and, whatever it is, eight circuits that do
recognize the privilege, so it’s not irresolvable.
And then on Professor Volokh’s tax example and the example of
people trying to get information from your paralegal and so on, that is what
we mean by the dispersion of power. If the reporter calls the IRS agent and
tries to get the tax returns, first of all, Justice Brandeis would say,
“Prosecute the IRS agent.”74 After that under our system we are, yes indeed,
relying on the good sense of the journalist to choose what to publish, and the
journalist may make wrong decisions, but that’s the balance that’s been
struck.
Gene’s paralegal example actually closely resembles the facts of a
real case in which some paralegal in gross violation of duty of
confidentiality to the firm revealed all kinds of purported misconduct of the
tobacco firms.75 That was outrageous behavior on the part of the paralegal
and rightly got the law firm outraged and the client outraged and coming
down like a ton of bricks on the paralegal. That doesn’t mean that the
reporter did anything wrong by publishing allegations of gross wrongdoing
that never would have come to light, nor that the public in fact didn’t benefit
73
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from it, and those are very much two different ideas which I think we need
to keep separate.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: I think we will take questions.
The floor is open.
ATTENDEE: I am curious to get your views about how far one goes in
terms of being a journalist, whether a blog or whatnot might fit into that
category. And I am also curious: you made this distinction between
somebody who is a passive recipient of information versus somebody who
goes out of their way to procure it in some way, although I think, Eugene,
you said it’s the bread and butter of reporters to call up and flatter people
and cajole them into, they are not paying them a bribe or extorting the
information, but they are doing an awful lot of stroking to get that
information. And I’m curious to get people’s views about when you cross
that line.
EUGENE VOLOKH: Let me turn to the first question about who is a
journalist and how that can be defined. I actually wrote a long article
talking about the way this relates to First Amendment protection, and I think
I have demonstrated that from basically before the Framing, up until 1970,
there is no authority whatsoever for the proposition that the freedom of the
press somehow specially belongs to institutional members of the press.76
All the authority was that freedom of the press belongs to anybody who uses
the device called the “press,” and by extension, other similar devices––could
be the Internet and a wide variety of other things.77
Then starting 1970, there have been a handful of lower court cases
that have said, “oh, well, the institutional press gets better protection,” and a
few hints about the possibility of that from Supreme Court opinions, though
many more holdings to the contrary from Supreme Court opinions.78 So it
seems pretty clear as to First Amendment protection that there can be no
distinction between professional journalists and others. And indeed the
circuit courts that have recognized the privilege as a First Amendment
matter––and that have then been asked, well, who is covered?––have all
made clear that you don’t have to be employed by a newspaper. You could
be a political organization. You could be a freelance book writer. You
could be a couple of academics trying to make a documentary.
However, as a statutory matter, it turns out that some statutes define
the scope of journalist-source protection very broadly. The California
statute is one of them.79 But some define it much more narrowly.
76
See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a
Technology?: From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459 (2012).
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Id. at 508–09.
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Delaware, I believe has very specific rules that require that you have made
money from this for at least 3 of the last 10 weeks or something along those
lines.80 And statutes are entitled to draw those kinds of distinctions.
The question is, “What is a sensible distinction?” I mean, to draw
the distinction between a journalist and a blogger is a funny thing these
days, given how many journalists have blogs, how many bloggers become
journalists, and how many blogs are bigger than many a newspaper and
more useful than many a newspaper.
[Laughter.]
EUGENE VOLOKH: So I am completely unbiased in this.
[Laughter.]
EUGENE VOLOKH: So I think as a statutory matter, one could draw the
distinction, but it’s just very hard to come up with really plausible
distinctions, especially ones that are written today as opposed to some 20 or
30 years ago where the lines seem to be a little bit sharper.
As to the line defining what is traditionally just criminal solicitation,
I was a little puzzled by Eric’s point—maybe I misunderstood Eric’s point,
but as I understood it––that the reporter shouldn’t be held liable even for
calling the person and asking him to leak things. Under standard criminal
law, that’s solicitation of a crime. It’s just hard for me to see what would be
the distinction under ordinary criminal law between soliciting that crime and
other crimes as opposed to, say, matter of prosecutorial discretion or as a
First Amendment matter if what you are soliciting is constitutionally
unprotected conduct, which by hypothesis the leak is going to be.
But I agree that, once one gets away from the clear solicitation, it
does become a very hard line to draw, because of the way conversations
often go, setting aside the situation where you just get something in your
mailbox and you publish it and you never once talked to the suspected
source.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Adam.
ADAM LIPTAK: So Eugene’s constitutional analysis about the meaning
of the press clause seems right to me. I do think that it’s possible to define
through some kind of functional way who is gathering and disseminating
information for the purpose of informing the public. It is the case that as a
practical matter, the Supreme Court decides who is and is not the press, who
gets to sit in the good seats. So it’s not that it hasn’t happened, and it’s
inconceivable to happen. So I think that can be overcome.

80
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As far as whether ordinary news gathering conduct amounts to
solicitation, I don’t think that’s a serious problem. I was this morning just
reading a federal judge’s blog. Did you know there were such things?
Judge Kopf in Nebraska has an excellent blog, and he wrote that one of the
lessons of the back-and-forth between the Second Circuit and Judge
Scheindlin in the stop-and-frisk case was that a good journalist’s job is to
make you say things you will regret.81
[Laughter.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Well, a prime case, if I can just
add a footnote to illustrate both of your points, is New York Times v.
Sullivan, that people forget that there were individuals involved—
ADAM LIPTAK: Exactly.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: —who bought and composed the
ad to heed their rising voices, and the opinion by Justice Brennan, one of the
leading First Amendment cases, drew absolutely no distinction in terms of
First Amendment between the New York Times, on the one hand, and the
individual defendants on the other.82 Let me just throw out one other things
that’s triggered by the solicitation comment. I have really never understood
the—suppose the leakers in general commit not one crime but two. The first
is acquiring whatever the document is which is in the nature of a theft, and
the second is disclosing it. What I have never really quite understood is why
if, for example, the document or whatever is a tape or a CD or a DVD,
something that is physical rather than just word of mouth, physical, and
somebody breaks into a government office and takes the DVD out and then
gives it to a reporter knowing that the DVD is stolen, why the reporter is not
guilty of receiving stolen property, I don’t understand that. And there are
many of the hypotheticals and actual cases that seem to fall within that
particular hypothetical.
ADAM LIPTAK: That was very much the subject, wasn’t it, of your
decisions in Boehner v. McDermott, the en banc decision, which divided the
D.C. Circuit quite closely, and I think Judge Sentelle’s response might be,
“Well, does that mean in every link of the chain?”83 So somebody gives it
to the reporter. The reporter publishes it. Somebody repeats what they read
in the newspaper over the breakfast table. Each of those things is a crime?
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Yeah. Well, that’s a line-drawing
thing, and we have a solution for it in the criminal law in the Fourth
Amendment cases, which is that the taint gets dissipated the further out you
81
RGK, In Answer to Scott H. Greenfield Regarding The Second Circuit’s Treatment of Judge
Scheindlin, HERCULES AND THE UMPIRE (Nov. 6, 2013), http://herculesandtheumpire.com/2013/11/06/inanswer-to-scott-h-greenfield-regarding-the-second-circuits-treatment-of-judge-scheindlin/.
82
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83
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go.84
ADAM LIPTAK: I say the taint gets dissipated when the material arrives
to me.
[Laughter.]
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: Well, and he has support for that in the rape case,
right?85 The guy who handed over the court records was committing a
crime, but the reporter was not.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: It doesn’t, by the way, apply in—
we hear cases all over the lot, as Judge Mukasey—we’ve had some child
pornography cases where the individual who does the filming is obviously
guilty, but every single person that downloads that image is also guilty of a
crime.86
EUGENE VOLOKH: But I would think that child pornography is special,
in part because–– while it’s not an element of the child pornography test that
it has to lack serious value––one of the reasons the court gave in New York
v. Ferber for treating it this way is precisely that it lacked value.87
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: This is one of the areas that Gene
just mentioned that makes so much of First Amendment law incoherent.
The Supreme Court again and again tells the state legislatures and the
Congress that if they draw a law that’s not content-neutral, it’s going to
violate the First Amendment unless there are compelling interests the other
way.88 And then when the Supreme Court decides cases, they decide them
on the basis of content.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Is this of public value? Does this
have artistic merit? I mean, all of that is content-based.
Anyway, next question.
ATTENDEE: Thank you. Thank you for your presentations. I am
studying evidence right now. I am in law school, and my question is in
regard, actually, to the principle that privilege stands on that every state—
that the state has a right to the testimony of every man, individual, and that,
I don’t understand, and I was hoping you could enlighten me, because it
seems like on what authority could the state make such a claim, because
especially in light of our society now and how much privacy is emphasized,
84
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because what is more private than the thoughts of every man, and to think
that the state has a right to them.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Whoever has the best hearing will
answer that question.
EUGENE VOLOKH: Well, the question was: what’s the foundation for
the principle that the law is entitled to every man’s evidence?
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Oh.
EUGENE VOLOKH: Which I take it, the answer is history and
practicality, but you could write books about it, and probably people have.
It’s because that’s the way it’s always been.
[Laughter.]
ATTENDEE: I was going to say perhaps because there are the inverse
canons that you don’t have to testify in certain circumstances by
implication. You have to in others.
I actually think that the point of the rape case incidence is very
important, because other than many of these cases, which are cast as Article
I actions that are being adjudicated by a purportedly independent Article III
tribunal, there you have a potential breach, although it may be relevant to a
law duly passed but not always. There, you have essentially a breach of
confidentiality coming out of an Article III branch itself, if I understand how
the case—
EUGENE VOLOKH: No, no. That was Florida Star v. B.J.F.89 It was a
police officer in Florida who—
ATTENDEE: Oh, it was a police officer. Okay, I apologize. I wasn’t sure
who did it. I only thought it helped my question to come more precisely on
point here.
But we do hear this almost as if Article III tribunals would be
abstracted wisdom, you know, applied, whether it’s through a balancing test
or an absolute statute guiding them. But I have observed in terms of
people’s access to criminal enforcement, which I think includes effectively
adjudication, that sometimes access to court materials and court proceedings
is very restrictive or effectively restrictive, in the sense that if you try to get
the records—I mean, records continue to be kept as little transcribed things,
and if you have a million bucks or there’s an appeal, that little transcribed
thing will be made into something that a reporter could read or that the
public could read.
And when I saw the subject of criminal enforcement, you know, and
89
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reporting, I am very concerned that there’s not more pressure from reporters.
So maybe it is a question of Adam, where there doesn’t appear to be—you
know, to have access to these materials of the adjudication process. Unless
you happen to be the reporter in the courtroom at the time it’s happening, I
found that it’s very difficult to fight through the kind of bastion that the third
branch actually erects in front of these materials.
ADAM LIPTAK: So you’re making a couple of practical points, which I’ll
address in a second, but I actually think the basic legal principle goes the
other way, where somewhat surprisingly the court has said that not only the
Sixth Amendment, which guarantees open trials, but also the First
Amendment, which really doesn’t speak to access to information, guarantees
a right of access to almost every part of every criminal and civil proceeding,
so long as the materials are submitted for adjudication.
As to whether it’s hard to get ahold of them, sometimes you have to
go to the courthouse. It’s also the case that the press, now that we’re
struggling to survive, is not a proxy for the public the way we were a couple
of decades ago where we really pressed access issues as a matter of
principle, even if there were not a story on the other side of it.
But I think this compared to other legal systems is actually a good
news story. Materials submitted to courts and court decisions in the United
States really are almost, without exception, open.
ATTENDEE: And I undertake this only because we’ve had to file FOIA
requests to get them in the Southern District of Ohio in cases that had been
very, very difficult. So I raise it. I realize I want to let other people ask
questions.
EUGENE VOLOKH: I wonder how much of that has to do with the
practice of transcripts being prepared after the fact by court reporters and
court reporters having kind of quasi-proprietary rights, just so they get paid,
so you can’t really get the transcripts. I wonder how much that’s the
concern, because I do think it’s true that often the transcript is actually not
prepared until much later, and I don’t think the original notes are a matter of
public record, usually as a practical matter.
ADAM LIPTAK: Typically, on PACER, which itself requires the payment
of a fee, which I think is problematic—PACER is the Federal Court
electronic filing system. Transcripts are usually not available and usually
require a separate fee to a private entity, and that strikes me, off the cuff, as
deeply problematic.
Some courts do have a practice, though, of limiting in time and
posting eventually the transcript, because the people who will pay for it are
typically the parties, the lawyers, and at some point in time, nobody is going
to pay for it anymore, and you might as well make it public then.
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ERIC M. FREEDMAN: Well, I was just going to say that I think Adam
may be a little too optimistic here, and I think that judges on the panel may
support me about this. There do exist secret dockets in the courts, which
was a long-term practice in terms of mafia and so on, which has expanded
radically for national security purposes to the point where people are filing
sealed cert. petitions in the United States Supreme Court. And there are
more and more parts of judicial records, which not only are sealed and then
the press can go to unseal them if they want, but whose existence isn’t even
known. I can’t tell you about it, because I don’t know about their existence.
But I think some of the judges can tell you that that’s correct.
MICHAEL MUKASEY: In my old court, the existence of a document had
to be made known. Documents, however, were sealed. Transcripts were
sealed, and proceedings were sealed. And I held a number of them myself
and required a finding that there was a good reason, usually because
somebody was likely to get killed if you didn’t seal it.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Yes, sir.
MICHAEL MUKASEY: I mean, just as an example, you have a mafia
case, and one defendant pleads guilty. You enter an item on the docket that
says Mr. X pleaded guilty, and you better believe that members of Mr. X’s
family are going to be in mortal danger if that docket entry gets out, gets out
immediately. There is every good reason to seal it.
ATTENDEE: I was wondering what the thoughts of the panel were on—
this seems to me to be intersection of kind of a right to anonymous
publishing, being able to speak anonymously, and the fact that the Founders
when talking politically like through the Federalist Papers or everything,
almost every one of them was using a fake name or done without any name
attached to it.
Secondly, do we know really that the person who gave the
information in these leak cases to the reporter was breaking the law?
Because obviously, someone broke the law when they disclosed it, but it
could have gone through two or three hands, potentially, before it gets to the
reporter. So we, at least in my opinion, don’t really know that the person
who gave it to the reporter was breaking the law.
EUGENE VOLOKH: I will save the second question for others, but the
first question, I think conflates two separate issues. One is, “Can the
government prohibit the publishing of certain things unless the published
thing has a name attached to it?” There had been lots of such laws. They
were struck down, first in Talley v. California in 1960.90 That was
reinforced in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995), where this
90
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whole original meaning question was debated by Justices Scalia and
Thomas.91
There’s an exception to that in the election campaign context where
the Court has upheld without a very deep discussion, the requirement that
broadcast ads, if I recall correctly, include the name of the funder right in
them.92 But as a general matter, you have the right to talk anonymously in
that you can’t be punished for talking anonymously.
It’s a whole separate question whether you have the right to insist
that your anonymity be retained. If I hand out leaflets that are defamatory of
you, I can’t be prosecuted on the grounds that I didn’t sign my name to
them. But if you wanted to sue someone for libel and you don’t know
whom to sue, but you think the printer might say, “Oh, that was Volokh that
came in and ordered it,” or the printer’s records might reflect that I paid for
it––or, these days, you go after the Internet Service Provider to try to track
down the identity of the poster––I don’t think any court has ever suggested
there is some absolute privilege or any court has ever suggested there is an
absolute privilege not to have your identity be disclosed even if there is a
prima facie case that what you did is civilly actionable or criminal.
And I think that’s got to be right, so long as you think there is any
role for libel law or for threats law or for whatever else. If I publish
something that is threatening, then presumably, the government could go
and subpoena the service providers to get my identity.
So I think the right to anonymous speech, which the court has
upheld, is just the right—not to be punished for the anonymity. It is not a
right never to have that veil of anonymity pierced.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: You were very charitable when
you mentioned the Supreme Court’s opinion in McCain-Feingold saying
they didn’t give much.93 They gave zero. You know, I am John Q. Smith,
and I approve this ad requirement. There is a line of Supreme Court cases,
City of Stratton comes to my mind, McIntyre, this line of cases that say you
have a First Amendment right to speak anonymously.94 In those cases, the
Supreme Court never even attempted to distinguish any of them in McCainFeingold upholding the disclosure statute.95
I’m sorry.
ADAM LIPTAK: I was going to ask the same question of Eugene of how
91
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does Doe v. Reed or Citizens United, which seems to say that some political
speech can be conditioned on disclosure, fit into your analysis.96
EUGENE VOLOKH: I think that Doe is a separate question. I’m actually
with Justice Scalia on that, although he was not entirely in dissent but
certainly not in the majority.97
I think that the government can require that you identify yourself
when you are signing a petition. In fact, you kind of have to identity
yourself to the government, and at that point, I think if a government wants
to say, “Look, if you want to take advantage of this procedure, we’re going
to reveal it to the public at large,” I don’t think that’s a limit on your
anonymous speech. It is a limit on your anonymously participating in this
lawmaking process, but I don’t think you have any right to anonymously
participate in that.
That was Justice Scalia’s point, which I think was correct.98 The
majority said, “Well, you have a conditional right, but it’s easily trumped.”99
Query whether that’s sound.
But as to the other point, the requirement that you identify yourself
on certain kinds of political ads, that certainly is an interference with
anonymous speech, but the Court has always justified that as an exception
justified under strict scrutiny. I agree with the Judge that the Court didn’t
explain why strict scrutiny is passed here, but it certainly tried to cabin the
no-anonymity rule to the campaign ad context. So as a general matter, the
Talley line of cases still remains, just with this carve-out, I think.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Yes, sir.
ATTENDEE: I see my government growing and my media with the good
seats shrinking, and so I’m thinking more and more about what is the role of
the press in these types of things. And what information I really want to
know as a citizen, what do you all think about a safe harbor from
prosecution relating to a reasonable belief and exposing a constitutional or
criminal violation? This is materially different than, say, individual
information that’s just there for the sake of wanting to put stuff out there,
but if there is a reasonable belief that a government actor or actors have
engaged in criminal or unconstitutional activity, that could be a bar from
prosecution.
ADAM LIPTAK: So that would seem to encompass Snowden. Yes? Or
96
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Manning or whoever leaked the warrantless wiretapping program to us in
the early 2000s.
I welcome judicial comment on that.
[Laughter.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: I’m not a prosecutor, so . . .
MICHAEL MUKASEY: I always thought that was what prosecutorial
discretion was all about, and putting it in a statute, I don’t think would
enhance it substantially, other than to have it reviewed by a judge.
EUGENE VOLOKH: Don’t some whistleblower statutes? I’m not at all
an expert, but don’t some whistleblower statutes try to draw that kind of line
at least to certain kinds of revelations?
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: They do, but the questionembodied-in-the-question is disclose to who, and if you disclose within the
report within the government, actions that you consider fraudulent, that’s
one thing, but to spread it on the front page of the New York Times may be
something quite different.
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: Well, there are employment discrimination
statutes that contain that exception,100 and this comes up from time to time,
interestingly, in lawyers’ ethics cases. You are fired from the law firm
because you blow the whistle on the law firm for some misconduct. There
are some cases in New York actually, I think, granting protection.101
ATTENDEE: But to answer your question about Snowden, the thing that I
envisioned was if you would face prosecution, but in the event that he could
convince a judge or jury that he acted in a reasonable fashion based on a
reasonable belief, that he could not be prosecuted, that’s different that
prosecutorial discretion, because it could be reviewed.
ERIC M. FREEDMAN: Then he may not be guilty anyway.
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: It is a curious thing, among other
curious things, about the First Amendment that oftentimes, you have to—
you as the speaker have to make a judgment about whether you’re doing one
of two things, giving the same speech, whatever it happens to be. You’re
either committing a criminal offense or you’re engaged in a very
highfalutin, sounding freedom of speech, and oftentimes, you won’t know
until you’ve given the speech and you are either indicted or not.
[Laughter.]

100
101
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ERIC M. FREEDMAN: That’s what Eugene V. Debs discovered.102
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Yeah, yeah. And Schenck and
Frohwerk and all the other cases that Holmes upheld convictions in.103
Anything else? Any closing comments, gentlemen?
[No audible response.]
JUDGE A. RAYMOND RANDOLPH: Okay. I guess we’re finished.
[Applause.]
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